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PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS IN THREE
COURTS OF TWO STATES
PHILIP SHUCHMAN*
One import of -these comments is that there are apt to be many
legal procedures which are concealed in the sense that there are such
limited public records that investigation sometimes cannot determine
with much precision what laws do and how and how often. For ex-
ample, we know very little of self-help repossession which -takes place
in many states without the intervention of any court action. Similarly,
we know little about the many lease and rent disputes that are termi-
nated by means of various actions by sheriffs and others empowered to
act without prior court approval, but under the authority given in
written agreements.
There is also the persistent problem of court records' being kept
for purposes other than historical and archival research. Court records
are maintained for the use of judges and court administrators. Tabula-
tion and analysis of their data is usually undertaken for purposes of
forecasting workload and efficiently allocating the use of the physical
plant and the judges' time. The files of individual cases are arranged
to suit the convenience of the parties, their lawyers and the judges.
Much of the content of court files depends upon the initiative of the
parties to -the lawsuit and is largely a function of how they settle their
controversies and what is most economical in practice. Too, there is
the overarching impact of the adversary system which tends to penalize
those who make the most complete statements and often makes a
tactical advantage of silence on vital matters.
The present example of these problems arises out of an investiga-
tion into the workings of the prejudgment attachment practices in
Connecticut and Massachusetts.' These practices are based on statutes
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
This research was funded by the National Science Foundation which, however, is
not responsible for the accuracy of the data, nor for the analyses and interpretations
which are the sole responsibility of the author.
The information was gathered by Christopher F. Kane, Antoinette L. Leone and
Bruce E. Maclnnis of the Connecticut Bar, and by Gregory Read. The data were pro-
grammed by Bruce E. Maclnnis and Matthew L. Shuchman and are on file with the
Buffalo Law Review.
1. We will often use the abbreviation "PJR" ("prejudgment remedy") to refer
to a prejudgment attachment. The term is in common use among Connecticut prac-
titioners.
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that permit a person to attach property-to take legal custody of it
(sometimes actual physical possession)-so that the attached property
normally cannot be sold or removed and remains available to satisfy
the plaintiff's judgment. The purpose of the prejudgment attachment
is almost always to create a lien or interest in the property attached
which will prevent its being sold (except subject to the plaintiff's in-
terest), and to give the attaching plaintiff priority over other and later
creditors. These prejudgment attachments should be distinguished
from proceedings to repossess property sold by installment contract or
otherwise subject to a security interest.2 The prejudgment attachment
is permitted if the plaintiff merely makes a claim that may result in a
judgment for money. At this first step in the legal proceedings there
is no judgment and not always a full lawsuit in the conventional mean-
ing of that term.
There are two types of proceedings for prejudgment remedies
(PJR's). The more common practice is the adversary proceeding.3 The
plaintiff files a motion with the court asking for an attachment of
property. The property to be attached and the amount of the claim
are both specified. A hearing date is set by the clerk of the court and
the papers are served on the defendant. The defendant can appear on
the hearing date and contest the identity or amount of the property
sought to be attached as well as the plaintiff's right to any attachment
at all. Our data show that few defendants appear. If they do appear,
even with counsel, it seems to make little difference. Almost without
exception -the attachment is then ordered by the court.
The ex parte attachment 4 is a response to more urgent needs of
the plaintiff-creditor. In this proceeding there is no hearing before the
attachment and no prior notice of -the attachment. The attachment is
ordered by the court at the request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's
lawyer sees to service of the writ of attachment, which is the first notice
the defendant gets. Thereafter, the defendant can usually get a prompt
2. The Supreme Court did not make such a distinction-or at least none with
doctrinal consequence-in the most recent case that raised the issue and in which the
attaching plaintiff had no rights equivalent to a security interest. See North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
None of our sample cases appeared to involve what is said to be the typical case,
that of a creditor with a perfected security interest. It has been contended that the
secured creditor is an identifiable individual who unquestionably has standing to pro-
tect his property interest which "would seem to be as potent as the debtor's" as regards
the right to due process. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:
Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. Rtv. 1510, 1532 (1975).
3. See text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 20-34 intra.
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hearing to contest or modify. Again our data show -that the procedure is
fairly routine, even perfunctory, and is rarely challenged.
In Connecticut and Massachusetts, as in many other states, there
have been various forms of these prejudgment remedies, usually attach-
ment of property, in various forms since well back into the 19th cen-
tury.9 Until the recent changes that resulted in the two types of PJR's,
all prejudgment attachments were ex parte: the clerk of the court
simply made a notation at the direction of the plaintiff's lawyer, and
the sheriff attached when suit was commenced. Thus all prejudgment
attachments were ex parte. This was the accepted and routine manner
for commencing a lawsuit. One judge suggested that a lawyer would
have been derelict in his duty to his client had he failed to obtain the
advantages of an attachment.6 Under the present law, however, the
plaintiff-creditor seeking such remedies must submit an affidavit show-
ing the need for what is now considered to be an extraordinary remedy,
especially if the attachment is sought ex parte, i.e., is accomplished
without advance notice and without a prior hearing at which the
defendant-debtor is or may be present.7
Recently the federal Supreme Court and several federal and state
appellate courts have specified criteria that establish the approximate
outlines of constitutional limitation. Creditors' rights to prejudgment
attachment seem to be subject -to certain procedural necessities and
showings, more or less, of various kinds of special circumstances: (1)
There must be judicial approval of the prejudgment attachment. The
issuance of a prejudgment attachment by a court clerk did not survive
constitutional challenge." (2) The grounds for the prejudgment at-
tachment must be clearly shown in an affidavit supporting the writ
(which orders the prejudgment attachment). (3) A bond must be
posted by the plaintiff-creditor to indemnify the defendant-debtor for
losses that may be sustained by reason of the attachment. 9 (4) The
defendant-debtor must have the right to regain possession of the at-
tached property (i.e., dissolve the attachment) by posting a bond. (5)
5. See generally Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment Execution:
Some American Problems Considered in the Light of English Experience, 5 CONN. L.
Rnv. 399 (1972-1973).
6. Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203, 205 (D. Mass. 1973) (three-judge
court).
7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278c(b) (West Supp. 1978). See also
id. § 52-728(e); MASs. R. Civ. P. 4.1(h),(f).
8. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975).
9. Neither the Connecticut nor the Massachusetts attachment statutes require that
the plaintiff-applicant post a bond to indemnify the defendant against damages resulting
from unlawful or excessive attachment.
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The defendant-debtor must have the right to an immediate or at least
a very prompt hearing before the court for the purpose of having the
attachment dissolved (and the property released) unless the plaintiff-
creditor "proves the grounds" upon which the writ issued, as well as
the probable existence of the debt.10 After the spate of early Supreme
Court and other appellate decisions crippling, if not entirely invalidat-
ing, various kinds of prejudgment attachments," the practices in Con-
necticut 12 and Massachusetts13 were both held unconstitutional. New
procedures were promptly enacted in both states.' 4
Similar situations arose elsewhere: Some state legislatures, antici-
pating that their prejudgment attachment statutes would be ruled con-
stitutionally infirm, enacted revised procedures by rule and statute."
There is little reason to suppose that the actual practices we describe
10. These five criteria first appeared in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600. 616-18 (1974) (plurality opinion distinguishing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972)). In Mitchell, the plurality found the presence of these five characteristics
enough to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. While the Court has referred
to this set of criteria to invalidate other statutes, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), it has neither stated that all five characteristics are
necessary to satisfy the Constitution, nor has it suggested which, if any, characteristics
are not necessary. In the absence of clear guidelines, most state and lower federal courts
have used all five criteria in assessing a statute's constitutionality. See, e.g., Guzman v.
Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 131 (8th Cir. 1975); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v.
Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Neb. 1977); Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp.
757 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge court), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Trainer v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Sugar v. Curtis, 383 F. Supp. 643, 647-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Carey v.
Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1977); Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d
1067, 1070 (Fla. 1977).
The Commercial Law League has drafted a "Model Notice and Hearing for Pro-
visional Remedies Act" which includes four of these five items and leaves to the states
whether the plaintiff must post a bond before utilizing a prejudgment attachment.
11. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
12. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), on remand, 360 F.
Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973) (three-judge court).
13. Bay State Harness Horse R. & B. Ass'n v. PPG Indus., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D.
Mass. 1973) (three-judge court); Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass.
1972) (three-judge court).
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-278a to 278m (West Supp. 1978) (originally
enacted as Pub. Act 73-431, § 1, effective May 30, 1973); MAss. R. Cxv. P. 4.1. See
also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223, §§ 42-83A (West Supp. 1977).
The Connecticut law was modified by 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-401 (effective
June 2, 1976). The changes in the Prejudgment Remedies Act are apt to make little
difference in the practices described by our data which were gathered while the 1973
law was in effect. Footnotes specify differences in the 1976 law where appropriate.
15. E.g., Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2402, 12-2405 (1976); CAL. CxV. PRAo.
CODE §§ 481.010-492.010 (West Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 8-502 (Supp. 1977); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 511-A:1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 6201, 6210-11
(McKinney Supp. 1978); R.I. R. Civ. P. 4; TEx. R. Civ. P. 592; VT. R. Civ. P. 4.1.
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in Connecticut and Massachusetts are apt to be much different in the
several other states with similar statutes.
I. PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT PROCEDURE
A. Types of Prejudgment Attachments
1. The "Adversary" PJR. In Connecticut the adversary PJR can
now be obtained by a plaintiff on the basis of an application supported
by an affidavit "[t]hat there is probable cause that a judgment will be
rendered in favor of the applicant" in an action soon to be com-
menced."" The affidavit must be accompanied by an order to be signed
by the clerk of the court which sets a hearing date for the PJR appli-
cation.17
The practice is much the same in Massachusetts, but instead of the
"probable cause" test used in Connecticut the applicable criterion in
Massachusetts is the "reasonable likelihood" of recovery of a judgment
in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment
sought.18 There is also the usual motion for approval of the PJR sup-
ported by an affidavit regarding the facts alleged and an application
for the prejudgment attachment.' 9
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278c(b) (West Supp. 1978).
17. Id. at § 52-278c(c).
18. MASS. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c). The tests employed by other states vary to some
degree. For example, in California the plaintiff must provide "an affidavit showing that
[he] ... would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is
based." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 484.030 (West Supp. 1977). Idaho demands that
"[a] plaintiff desiring . ..a writ of attachment ... file with the court an application
. . . supported by an affidavit . . . setting forth .. . [t]hat defendant is indebted to
plaintiff. . . ." IDAHO CODE § 8-502 (Supp. 1977). In New Hampshire, when the de-
fendant objects to the attachment, "the burden shall be on the plaintiff to show that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment . . . on any
amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment. .. ." N.H. Rev. STAT.
ANN. § 511-A:3 (Supp. 1975). However, the notice of intent to attach that plaintiff
must "cause to be served" on defendant apparently requires no such showing. Id.,
§511-A:2. New York sets forth grounds for attachment that demand more than affi-
davits supporting merely "probable cause" or "reasonable likelihood" of recovery. See
N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAw § 6201 (McKinney Supp. 1978). Rhode Island requires plain-
tiff to file a motion for authority to attach, but the court may authorize the attachment
only "after . . . learning . . ., notice of which has been given to the defendant."
R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-5-2 (Supp. 1976); see 1965 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 55, § 50; R.I.
Acts and Resolves (1965) (current version at R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-5-2 (Supp. 1976) ).
See also R.I. GEN. LAWs § 10-5-5 (1969). In Texas, the grounds for attachment are
similar to those in New York, i.e., the defendant must make an affidavit stating that de-
fendant is "justly indebted" to him, and also he must assert one of 12 additional grounds.
Tnx. CODE ANN. tit. 13, art. 275- (Vernon 1973); See Tax R. Civ. P. 592. Vermont
requires finding by the court of "a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover
judgment . . . ." VT. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (b)(3).
19. Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c),(h).
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2. The Ex Parte PJR. The ex parte prejudgment attachments
are obviously more serious incursions into the usual due process re-
quirements of prior notice and an opportunity to be heard in defense
of one's rights to property. This notice and chance to appear in court
must be given before any property rights of the defendant can be
affected and obviously before any property of the defendant can be
attached or otherwise "taken" by a sheriff or other court officer. Thus
there are, in both states, additional requirements: special circumstances
must be alleged in -the supporting affidavit.20 Only then can this extra-
ordinary remedy be granted. The language of the courts is grave, and
the commentary of the scholars of constitutional law is serious. The
cases that invalidated various forms of prejudgment attachment,2' and
especially the ex parte modes, were and are taken as the legal ma-
chinery that might adapt the due process clause of the 14th Amendment
to widespread contemporary problems. However, except in the gross
result of paramount importance, namely, that the PJR is used much
less often, our data suggest that much of the discussion bears a rather
limited relation to the realities we found.
B. Ex Parte Practice in Connecticut
The ex parte prejudgment attachment in Connecticut2 2 can be
allowed only by a judge and only upon a sworn written statement (the
affidavit) that there is probable cause that the debt is owed and at least
one more of the statutorily required criteria is met: there must be a
reasonable likelihood (A) that the defendant-debtor does not live in
or have an office in the state; 23 (B) that he has hidden or will hide him-
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-2783e (West Supp. 1978); MAss. R. Civ.
P. 4.1(f),(h).
The "special circumstances" exception to the usual requirement of a pre-attachment
hearing was set forth in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972), although the
types of circumstances which Fuentes envisioned, such as protecting public health or
war emergency, seem no longer to be required by the federal courts, e.g., Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant, Inc., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), or the state courts, e.g., Unique Caterers, Inc.
v. Rudy's Form Co., 338 So. 2d 1067, 1071, (Fla. 1977). See generally Brabham,
Sniadach Through Di-Chem and Backwards: An Analysis of Virginia's Attachment
and Detinue Statutes, 12 U. RicH. L. Rxv. 157, 167 (1977).
21. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
22. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278e (West Supp. 1978).
23. See Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-401, § 2 (1976) (also added the language "and
is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction over his person by the court" to ground (A) ).
This may mean that if the jurisdictional ground for the PJR is used, the court must
be satisfied that the long-arm statute will not apply. The defendant could seek to have
the attachment dissolved alleging that he was subject to in personam jurisdiction. This
seems to have been held in Massachusetts. See Welsh v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp. 913,
914 (D. Mass. 1975); but cf. Wood v. Wood, - Mass. , 342 N.E.2d 712, 714,
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self so that he cannot be served with normal process (a complaint or the
equivalent); (C) that the defendant-debtor is about to remove himself
or his property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors;
(D) that he has or will dispose of his property; (E) that the defendant
has fraudulently hidden or withheld money or other property which
should go to pay his debts; (F) that defendant-debtor has stated that
he is insolvent or that he is unable to pay his debts as they mature,
which is another common definition of insolvency.2 4
The defendant-debtor can move to dissolve or modify (so that
less property will be subject to the attachment, or for some replace-
ment or substitution of property) the ex parte prejudgment attach-
ment, and the court will "hear and determine such motions expedi-
tiously." 25 The plaintiff-creditor, it is written, must bear the burden
of proving that there is "probable cause" to continue the attachment
in force; otherwise the prejudgment attachment is to be dissolved26
But the actual practice and procedure in Connecticut-though the law
in the books may satisfy the constitutional requirements-seem to be
subject to merely formal judicial control.27 There is little information
of record even in the court files, to say nothing of the reported cases.
Why is that? The lawyer prepares an affidavit (often he buys a printed
717 (1976) (allowing both quasi in rem jurisdiction over the owner's interest in real
property based on a prejudgment attachment and personal jurisdiction against the owner
based on the Massachusetts long-arm statute).
The import of our study is that such provisions are apt to make little difference
in the practices we observed.
24. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-401, § 2 (1976) (added defendant's ownership
of real property as additional ground for ex parte attachment. This ground did not
exist at the time the present study was carried out).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278e (West Supp. 1978). In 1976 a provision
was added whereby the defendant can stay the proceeding if he posts a bond. 1976.
Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-401, § 1(c) (current version in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
278d(c) (West Supp. 1978). But that had been informally permitted before 1976. In
only one of the 674 prejudgment attachments of both types in Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts did we find a bond posted by a defendant to obtain full legal possession (or
physical possession) of the attached property. Although the claims (the amounts in con-
troversy) are much larger in our sample, the same observation was made of the pre-judgment replevin actions in the Small Claims Court of Dade County (Florida), which
had a jurisdictional limit of $300. 1953 Fla. Laws ch. 28278 (repealed by 1972 Fla.
Laws ch. 72.404, § 30 (eff. Jan. 1973) ). The appellants in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972) stated that no counterbonds had been posted in 442 such cases in
Florida. Id. at 84-85, n.14.
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278e (West Supp. 1978).
27. We found nothing of record in the files of the ex parte proceedings in Con-
necticut nor did we hear of any in which a plaintiff seeking an ex parte prejudgment
attachment was asked about the necessary allegations (items A through F) ; nor, so far as
we could tell, did any plaintiffs have to offer any supporting evidence to the judge
before having the ex parte application signed. It appears, however, that some are not
granted by some judges, though this is not often a problem. See text accompanying notes
86-88 infra.
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form) which tracks the statutory requirements. The form recites item
G (that there is "probable cause" to believe that the plaintiff will ob-
tain a judgment later), and at least one item from A through F must
be checked (the several statutory bases for the ex parte prejudgment
attachment). The lawyer then takes that affidavit with a writ (a request
for the ex parte prejudgment attachment) 28 to a judge, ordinarily in
chambers. If the judge is satisfied that the statutory requirements are
met-i.e., G (the "probable cause" that -the plaintiff will get a judg-
ment) and one of the A through F items is checked-he signs the writ
allowing prejudgment attachment without prior notice and without
any opportunity for the defendant-debtor to be heard in opposition.
There is no court record of this procedure yet; nor will there be for a
while, if at all. The lawyer then has a sheriff serve the writ and attach
the property. There is a public record only if the attached property is
real estate. 29 For most personal property the sheriff, having attached,
returns the endorsed writ30 together with his "return," a concise state-
ment of the costs and the sheriff's fees. Frequently, though we do not
know how often, the matter is then promptly settled. The defendant
or his lawyer enters into an agreement or stipulation for payment. The
lawyer who prepared the writ with affidavit does not want to "enter"
or docket the writ (i.e., have it noted in the court records) because his
client will then have to pay a $20 filing fee;31 while if nothing further
is done, there is no filing fee, but neither is there any public record.
C. Ex Parte Practice in Massachusetts
Rule 4.1(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs ex parte pre-
judgment attachment in Massachusetts.3 2 The complaint (the state-
28. The specimen forms of application, order and summons are in CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-278c (West Supp. 1978).
29. Attachments of real estate are made by filing a copy of the certificate of
attachment with the town clerk where the real estate is located. The certificate is
recorded in the land records of the town. See id. § 52-285 (West Supp. 1978); 1 E.
STEPHEFNSON, CONNECTICUT CIVIL PROCEDURE § 41, at 161-63 (1970).
This is also true in Massachusetts, where attachment of real estate is not effective
as against later attaching creditors unless a certified copy of the writ is filed for record-
ing in the proper office for registry of deeds. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223, § 63(West Supp. 1977). The practice is discussed in Bay State Harness Horse R. & B.
Ass'n v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mass. 1973).
30. The endorsement states what the sheriff attached and where and when in
'response to the quaint language of the writ: "Hereof, fail not but due service and
return make." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278c (West Supp. 1978).
The Massachusetts form of direction to the sheriff is also sonorous: "and make
due return of this writ with your doings thereon." MAss. R. Civ. P. 4.16, Forms App.,
Form No. 2, at 356.
31. Many lawyers are paid a flat fee including the costs and thus would have to
absorb the entry fee (since increased to $25 in Connecticut).
32. MAss. R. Civ. P. 4.1(f).
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ment of the claim made in the lawsuit) need not be filed. Instead an-
other form is used which satisfies the requirements of Rule 4.1(c)
that there be both a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover
at least the amount of the judgment he seeks and one or more of the
following: (1) the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court (he is a nonresident or is about to leave the jurisdiction or has
left); (2) the defendant may, if he knows of the attachment, remove
or conceal his property; (3) the defendant may damage or destroy the
property.33
Except for any differences between "probable cause" (Connecti-
cut) and "reasonable likelihood" (Massachusetts), the specific grounds
for an ex parte prejudgment attachment vary only in one important
particular: Connecticut allows an ex parte proceeding on the ground
that the defendant "has stated that he is insolvent or 'has stated that he
is unable to pay his debts as they mature."3 4 Massachusetts has no such
statutory or procedural rule provision.85
33. Id.
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278e (West Supp. 1978). But see note 23 supra.
35. The requirements of other states vary to a degree. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 485.010(a) (West Supp. 1977) (states that "no right to attach order or writ of
attachment may be issued . . . unless it appears from facts shown by affidavit that
great or irreparable injury would result to the plaintiff if issuance of the order were
delayed until the matter could be heard on notice."); IDAHO CODE § 8-502 (Supp.
1977) (permits an ex parte attachment if "(1) [t]he jurisdiction of the court is predi-
cated upon attachment of the defendant's property within [the] state; [or] (2) [t]he
property specifically sought to be attached consists of one or more negotiable instru-
ments . . . [or] (3) [t]he property specifically sought to be attached is a bank account
subject to the threat of imminent withdrawal, or is perishable, and will perish before
any noticed hearing can be had, or is in immediate danger of destruction, serious harm,
concealment, removal from the state, or of sale to an innocent purchaser .... ") ;
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 511-A:8 (Supp. 1975) (permits ex parte attachments if
I. There is a substantial danger the property sought to be attached will be
damaged, destroyed, concealed, or removed from the state .... II. An attach-
ment is necessary to vest quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. III. In equity cases for
specific performance of an agreement to transfer land or a unique chattel,
there is imminent danger of transfer to a bona fide third party. IV. An attach-
ment is necessary to prevent the absolute vesting of title in a purchaser upon
the imminent expiration of the notice period under a bulk sale. V. When neces-
sary to secure an important . . . public interest, or when other exceptional cir-
cumstances are established to the satisfaction of the court . ... ) ;
TEX. R. Civ. P. 592 (in a somewhat novel approach, provides that "[n]o writ [of
attachment] shall issue except... after a hearing, which may be ex parte." VT. R. Civ.
P. 4.1(b) (4) (requires that reasonable recovery by plaintiff be reasonably likely, and
that (a) the defendant is not subject to the court's jurisdiction, (b) there is a "clear
danger" that defendant will leave the state or conceal attachable property, or (c) that
there is an "immediate danger" shown by specific facts that defendant will damage,
destroy or sell such property to a bona fide purchaser).
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II. THE ARCHIVES
A. In Connecticut
We looked for PJR's in the Connecticut Common Pleas Courts in
Bridgeport and Hartford. We examined only those based on debt and
excluded the PJR's in tort cases, mostly personal injury actions. Most
of the courts do not separately index PJR's of either type. Only in one
court were we able to find PJR's noted in the court dockets. In an-
other court we had the cooperation of the clerk and were able to have
all the adversary and ex parte PJR's recorded for one month, as the
writs were filed. That was fortunate because it was one of only three
months during which lawyers obtaining ex parte writs had to pay -the
filing fee and thus have the writ indexed; 36 this required the writs to
be brought to the clerk of the court, thus enabling the persons in the
clerk's office to record them for us. 7 During that month there were
filed 187 adversary prejudgment attachments and 22 applications for
ex parte prejudgment attachments, all of which were granted. This
full record for one month in one busy court (Hartford) revealed a
10% frequency of ex parte applications. In our full sample of pre-
judgment attachments in Connecticut we found nearly one-in-seven
(about 14%) ex partes.38 We take the one-month frequency (10%) as
a minimum figure.
One other datum can be estimated. During that month in which
209 PJR's were filed, there were about 416 contract-based civil actions
started in that court.3 9 Thus about half of all contract-based civil ac-
tions in the Hartford Common Pleas Court were started by prejudg-
ment attachment pursuant to the new statute and practices.
Given the approximately one-in-two frequency in one court for
one month, the gross impact of the new statute may be assayed, though
with more than the usual qualifications. A rough count of similar ac-
tions in the Hartford Common Pleas Court (the earlier Circuit Court
figures were not conveniently available to us) for two months in 1970
36. The clerk of the court obtained that concession briefly. The practitioners ob-
jected successfully.
37. This practice briefly created something of a known public record but the
PJR's were still in the midst of massive archives that made them difficult to find.
38. The Connecticut sample was 433 cases. However, in Bridgeport we used every
ex parte case found but only every other adversary PJR; hence the sample size for this
computation must be increased by 163, the number of Bridgeport adversary PJR's not
included in the study. Thus we have 83 ex partes of 596 prejudgment attachments, or
about one-in-seven (14%).
39. Effective January 1, 1975 the Circuit Court and the Court of Common Pleas
were combined. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-141a (WestSupp. 1977). This section
was repealed by 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-436, § 79.
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and two months in 1971 revealed that some four-fifths (79%) of these
actions were commenced by prejudgment attachment.40 We have no
reason to think the process very unstable (most lawyers doing such
work follow routine practices) or that there are other factors that
could have caused such a difference. We think it is the effect of the
new statute with its revised practices and increased steps that has re-
duced the frequency of prejudgment attachments from about 79% to
about 50%.41
We think that for Connecticut a rough extrapolation is warranted
based on the 209 prejudgment attachments in one month in the Com-
mon Pleas Court in Hartford.42 There are apt to be on the order of
2,500 prejudgment attachments a year or more in Hartford in the
Common Pleas Court alone. The Hartford metropolitan area's 1970
population was .664 million and that of the state of Connecticut was
3.039 million. For the state this would rough out to more than 11,000
prejudgment attachments annually (the population multiple is more
than 4.5).4a
40. We found 130 consumer contract actions. Twenty-seven (21%) were com-
menced without prejudgment attachment and 103 (79%) were started with applica-
tion for a PJR. We were unable to determine how many attachments were actually
made.
41. We examined several plausible rival hypotheses that might have accounted for
part of the dramatic decrease in the use of PJR's from about four out of five such cases
to one in three. There was no decrease in consumer credit, which in fact increased
every year from 1972 through 1975. There was little change in the frequency of de-
faults: The incidence of defaults in consumer loans increased slightly during most of
the period from 1972 through 1975.
Finally, we thought that the decrease in PJR usage might be differential. Inquiries
with practitioners and one judge tended to suggest that the consistent and routine
users of PJR's continued to use them much as before the new statute. The larger
number of lawyers who do not conduct a practice heavy in collection work might have
been deterred by the additional steps and formalities of the revised practice. We also
felt that the lawyers engaged in collection practice would be aware of the realities of
the new practice and continue to utilize PJR's much as before. But examination of
PJR's for two months each in 1970 and 1971 and comparison with PJR's well after
the new Act (Summer, 1975) revealed no such pattern. In fact on this limited sample
we could infer nothing from the identity of the lawyers and their frequency of PJR use
of record.
42. There is another court in Hartford (the Superior Court) which can and does
issue prejudgment attachments, but for larger amounts because the Superior Court has
a minimum jurisdictional requirement of $7,500. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-10 (West
Supp. 1978) (repealed effective July 1, 1978, by 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-436,
§ 177). If the amount claimed is less than $7,500 the matter may be removed to the
Common Pleas Court. Id. § 52-6 (West Supp. 1978) (repealed, effective July 1, 1978,
by 1976 Conn. Pub Acts, No. 76-436, § 242).
43. Obviously the figure for all prejudgment attachments is higher but we do not
know how many larger claims are made by that remedy and we do not know how often
it is used in noncontract cases.
From examination of several weeks of the Short Calendar listing of matters to be
heard by the Superior Court in Hartford, we estimate that there are about 10 applica-
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Ordinarily, when a judge declines to approve the application for
an ex parte writ there is no record of that "non-event" in Connecticut.
Practitioners say that this is a rare occurrence, and that the same ap-
plication is then taken to another judge. It is apparently quite unusual
for a practitioner to be unable to get an ex parte writ signed by some
judge.
During the months of the prejudgment attachment records which
we examined in Springfield, Massachusetts, only one judge sat; hence
we could not find out whether similar practices prevailed in Massa-
chusetts. It appears, however, that except for the defendants for whom
the Springfield court would be a distant or inconvenient forum, the
applications for ex parte prejudgment attachments were routinely
granted.
We restricted our samples in all courts to contract-based actions.
The contract-based PJR's are indexed no differently from other mo-
,tions filed in the Common Pleas Courts in Connecticut. There are
hundreds of such motions weekly in active trial courts with jurisdiction
over claims up to $7,500 in civil matters. Thus the docket entries are
of little help. We therefore examined the files of motions for several
months and identified the PJR's. Once enough of the PJR's were
found, we examined the subset of ex parte PJR's. In Connecticut we
took (from the Common Pleas Courts in Bridgeport and Hartford) a
total sample of 433 (+ 163) prejudgment attachment files. There were
350 (+ 163) adversary proceedings (86%) and 83 (14%) ex parte
actions.44
We found that even in the adversary PJR's-those where the at-
tachment order was issued only after a hearing-there were in fact
very few contested hearings. A check of hearings scheduled on "ad-
versary" PJR's within the preceding two months against examination
of the actual daily court records of what took place in the court re-
vealed that almost all those hearing dates had passed without any
party's appearing. This confirmed what we had been told by several
lawyers engaged in debtor-creditor work.45
tions a week for prejudgment attachment in that court alone. The Superior Court in
Hartford covers about a fourth of the State's population. Thus there may be some
1500 additional PJR's (but for larger claims) annually in Connecticut.
44. See note 38 supra.
45. It was also confirmed by examination of several weeks of printed listings of
such motions (adversary) for PJR's in the Superior Court of Connecticut. That court's
jurisdiction is limited to claims exceeding $7,500, see note 42 supra, and we did not
otherwise examine the court records. However, in six weeks (with 61 such motions)
only two hearings were actually held in which defendant appeared and his counsel
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B. In Massachusetts
The new Massachusetts rules of court regulate attachments of both
the conventional or adversary type and the ex parte type. The require-
ments are, as in Connecticut and most other states, set forth in a form.
The mechanics of obtaining a conventional prejudgment attachment
with hearing begin with the filing or entry of a complaint. The plain-
-tiff must also file a writ of attachment and a motion for approval of
the attachment. The latter documents must be supported by an affi-
davit which satisfies the judge that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the plaintiff will recover a judgment for at least the amount of the
attachment he seeks. 46
We sampled the files in the District Court in Springfield, Massa-
chusetts, which is the seat of Hampden County. The District Court has
jurisdiction if any property to be attached is in the county, or if either
party lives in the county or has a place of business there.47 This can
create what might be problems in the choice by plaintiffs of distant
forums inconvenient for the defendants. But there were in fact very
few defendants from any other county in Massachusetts, excluding, of
course, those defendants alleged to be residents of other states.4
In Springfield the applications for all the many kinds of writs and
motions were kept by the court clerk. From examination of these ap-
plications we were able to determine which were for prejudgment at-
tachments. Also, the applications contained the names of the parties
and the dates, which enabled us to find out the docket numbers from
the index cards prepared by the court personnel for each new case.
Using the docket numbers, we were able to examine a sample of all
these prejudgment attachment files, and by that direct examination got
a smaller sample of those based on contractual obligations. These were
divided by whether adversary or ex parte prejudgment attachments.
either contested the attachment, or sought to limit it. All the other requests resulted in
the granting of the attachment order for want of an appearance by the defendant-
debtor.
46. MASS. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c),(f).
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223, § 2 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
48. Most actions in the Massachusetts District Courts (the source of our sample in
Springfield) must be brought in the county where one of the parties lives or has a
place of business; and if the defendant is not a resident of Massachusetts, the action is
to be brought where an attachment was made. Id. See 9 J. NOLAN, MASSACHUSETTS
PRACTICE §§ 124-126 (1975).
Ordinarily claims up to $4000 are to be tried in the District Court. But unless the
defendant takes formal action to remove a larger claim to the Superior Court (with un-
limited jurisdiction), the District Court has, for our purposes, jurisdiction concurrent
with the Superior Court. See id. § 104 (1975). We found no efforts at removal from the
District Court.
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By far most of the contractual obligations arose out of consumer
credit transactions. Although most of the plaintiffs were retailers, and
most of the defendants were individuals, persons apparently not en-
gaged in business, the amounts of goods and money involved were
relatively large.
In Springfield we found 241 of these PJR's covering a period of
nearly 12 months; of that group, 27 (11%) were ex parte proceedings.
Thus the ex parte prejudgment attachment, although slightly less fre-
quent than the sample in Connecticut (14%), is not an occasional or
unusual practice in Massachusetts-as it is not in Connecticut.'19
Although our Massachusetts sample includes not less than 15 from
each of twelve months, we have no way of estimating the frequency of
prejudgment attachments in Springfield short of examining every one
of -thousands of index cards for the many kinds of remedies obtained
by writs and motions for at least a few months during a year; and then
examining all the files indicated to be prejudgment attachments. That
undertaking was simply beyond our means. We believe, however, that
our 11% finding is a reliable estimate of the relative frequency of
ex parte proceedings in contract-based prejudgment attachments.
The records of the applications for prejudgment attachments in
Massachusetts under the earlier statute were apparently prepared and-
kept much as they are under the new practice. Thus, a researcher
might have to examine several thousand files to get a reliable estimate
of how many prejudgment attachments there were in a particular
court over an adequate period of time.
III. THE PARTIES, PRACTICES AND PROPERTY ATTACHED
A. Grounds for Ex Parte PJR's
The usual reasons assigned for the ex parte prejudgment attach-
ments are about the same in both states. This is considered an extra-
ordinary remedy and federal and state appellate courts have made clear
that the grounds must be such as to warrant what is presumptively a
denial of due process00 The defendant has no chance to learn about or
challenge the ex parte prejudgment attachment which may severely
49. The frequencies of ex parte prejudgment attachments are very close as measured
in Massachusetts (11%) and in Connecticut (14% for our full sample and 10% as
counted for one month in one court).
50. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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injure him by effective deprivation of his property interests. Although
the numbers are small, the most common reasons given in Massachu-
setts are that the person named is about to sell the property sought to
be attached or that he is apt to conceal it (18, or 69% of our cases).51
The other reasons are jurisdictional: The person is either a nonresident
or intends to leave the state (8 cases, or 31%). 52The Connecticut
equivalents are: about to sell or conceal the property, 21 (25%); juris-
dictional reasons, 28 (34%). With the exception of a few divorce cases
in which an out-of-state address was given, I doubt that the jurisdic-
tional foundations for ex parte attachments could be sustained if proof
beyond the statements of the plaintiff or his counsel were required.
This opinion is based on little record evidence53 but comes from casual
and continued inquiry.
The jurisdictional bases for the ex parte prejudgment attachments
are intended to give the plaintiff a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction
so that he can prosecute his claim in the courts of the state where he
resides. These might include such grounds as that the defendant will
leave or has left the jurisdiction or will conceal himself. But the option
of service of process at the last known place of abode of the defendant 4
and the increased breadth and scope of the various long-arm statutes55
are such that we think the actual attachment is rarely necessary to ob-
51. No file revealed any evidence of concealment of goods or property sought to
be attached. In a few cases the sheriff's return stated that he was unable to find the
designated property. But since the writs frequently specified certain property and added
such catch-all phrases as "all other personal property on the premises," the sheriff usually
managed to attach something. Only in 3 of the 110 ex parte cases was the sheriff un-
able to attach any property of the defendant.
52. One file gave no reason.
53. There were no appearances from outside the state. There was only one indi-
cation of any service having been made outside the state and that was in a divorce case
where, one would suppose, the public interest is more involved than in the routine col-
lection efforts of a creditor.
54. Although manual service on the defendant is generally preferred, service of
process by leaving a copy of the suit papers at the "last and usual place of abode"
known (Massachusetts) "or at his usual place of abode" (Connecticut) is on a parity
with personal service of process in both states. There need not have been prior effort
to make personal service on the defendant. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-54 (West
Supp. 1978); MAss. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223, § 31
(West Supp. 1977-1978); 14A D. SIMPSON & H. ALPERIN, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTrcE
§ 1222 (1974).
55. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b. (West Supp. 1978); 1 E. STEPHENSON,
supra note 29, § 26, at 96-100 (1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223 A (West
Supp. 1977-1978) (see especially § 3 and the Practice Commentary following), The
Massachusetts long-arm statute is also discussed in 14A D. SImPsON & H. ALPERIN,
supra note 54 § 1193 (1974).
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tain jurisdiction over the defendant.56 Nor does prejudgment attach-
ment appear to be much used for necessary jurisdictional purposes."7
Massachusetts does not have the most common ground used in
Connecticut, that the defendant has stated that he is insolvent or un-
able to pay his debts. In the Connecticut sample this was the basis for
34 of 83 (41%) of the ex parte prejudgment attachments. Whether
and why these are extraordinary grounds sufficient to overcome the
due process requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the taking of the attachment, is best left to the theorists in con-
stitutional law. 8 From the less Olympian posture of the practitioner
it seems relatively easy to get an ex parte writ on grounds of insolvency
or inability to pay debts by a telephone inquiry aptly phrased. The
legal definitions of insolvency also make this a preferred basis for the
ex parte writ for evidentiary reasons. One common definition of in-
solvency is the inability to pay debts as they mature and become due
and owing. Of course the debtor's inability to pay this plaintiff's debt
can be sufficient proof of this kind of insolvency. This should be an
easier foundation than the usual bankruptcy definition, a sort of bal-
ance sheet notion-whether the debtor's assets at fair valuation are suffi-
cient to pay his debts.60
56. Most of the commentators seem to agree. An early and trenchant criticism is
Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdictioh, 76 HARV. L. Rnv. 303
(1962).
57. The jurisdictional grounds are alleged, but so far as we could determine from
the sparse records and inquiries with practitioners, there is rarely a true case of con-
cealment or flight from the jurisdiction. See also note 53 supra.
58. "Extraordinary situations" were considered constitutionally necessary to justify
ex parte attachment at the time Connecticut and Massachusetts enacted their statutes.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). But see note 20 supra. Presumably the
state statutes were intended to incorporate contemporary federal law.
59. Consider the following colloquy: Q. Can't you pay your debts? A. No. (or
even) Not now.
It seems evident that the "extraordinary situation" requirement of the Supreme
Court opinions, see note 58 supra, is largely ignored in practice, and it is certainly
questionable whether these two statutory grounds (statement of insolvency and inability
to pay debts) satisfy the "extraordinary situation" exception to the usual due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard before any "taking".
60. See Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970); J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 13, 15 (1956). But in the event of bankruptcy within
four months, an attachment on these grounds can create the problem of a voidable
preference under § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). The attach-
ment itself will be an act of bankruptcy such that other creditors can file an involuntary
petition.
The extreme did occur when a bank placed an attachment on unencumbered real
estate at a time when the debtor was insolvent and bankruptcy followed within four
months. The bankruptcy court held the lien of the attaching creditor to be null and void
under § 67(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1) (1970). See In re Hunter Press, Inc., 51 Ahl.
BANKR. L.J. 76 (1977), remanded, 420 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1977).
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TABLE 1
BASES FOR Ex PARTE PROCEEDINGS
Connecticut Massachusetts
About to sell or
conceal property 21 25% 18 69%
Nonresident or intends
to hide or leave state 28 34% 8 31%
Defendant stated insolvent
or unable to pay debts 34 41
(Conn. only)
N = 83 N1 - 26
'One of 27 files specified no basis
B. The Users. of PJR's
Like the bases for the remedy, plaintiffs in the two states are much
alike. Banks are common as plaintiffs in both states: 160 of 433 (37%)
in Connecticut; and 72 of 241 (30%) in Massachusetts. Finance Com-
panies and various other kinds of loan companies account for 6% in
Connecticut and 5% in Massachusetts. Unidentified individuals make
up nearly 20% in Connecticut and just over 8% in Massachusetts.
Other businesses, nearly all retail sellers, make up more than half of
the plaintiffs in Massachusetts-188 of 241 (57%). In Connecticut all
other businesses used both types of PJR's only 163 times (38%).
Banks are the most common users of the ex parte PJR's in both
states, although in Massachusetts banks tend to use ex parte PJR's
slightly but not significantly more than in Connecticut: 12 of 27
(44%) in Massachusetts and 29 of 88 (35%) in Connecticut. The rea-
son for this appears to be that the banks are engaged in the credit card
business if only by acting as plaintiff-collection agents for credit card
lenders.61 Of course these are unsecured debts. Massachusetts banks
tend to use adversary PJR's slightly less than Connecticut banks: 60 of
214 (28%) users in Massachusetts were banks; 131 of 350 (37%) in
Connecticut.
In our sample all other business together used ex parte PJR's little
more than banks alone. In Connecticut all other businesses except for
61. A later sampling of banks as plaintiffs in PJR proceedings supplemented with
specific inquiries revealed that 40 percent or more of the bank PJR's were for credit
card accounts.
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small loan and finance companies used ex parte PJR's only 27 times in
83 cases (33%); in Massachusetts just 14 times in 27 cases (52%).
TABLE 2
USERS OF PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS
Connecticut
Banks (including credit
card lenders)
Other licensed lenders
(finance companies)
Individuals
Other businesses
(including retail
sellers)
Adversary
(with Hearing)
131 37%
5%
19%
136 39%
= 350
Ex Parte All PJR's
29 35% 160 37%o
9
18
27
N= 83
117 25
22% 85
33% 163
N=433
6%y
20%
38%
Massachusetts
Banks (including credit
card lenders) 60 28%
Other licensed lenders
(finance companies) 11 5%
Individuals 19 9%
Other businesses
(including retail
sellers) 124 58%
N - 214
12 44% 72 30%
4%
14 52% 138
N = 27 N = 241
C. The Transactions That Result in PJR's
The transaction that was the basis for the prejudgment attach-
ment is known for nearly all our sample cases. In Connecticut the
major categories are promissory notes (loans) and credit card accounts
which account for 188 cases (44%) of the proceedings. The other large
category comprises goods and merchandise sold on credit by install-
ment or on a charge account. These account for 79 cases (19%) in
Connecticut. Together nearly two-thirds of all the prejudgment attach-
ments are the result of these types of transactions. Much the same is
8%
57%
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true in Massachusetts: These two categories account for more than
half (about 51%) of all the prejudgment attachments we found.
TABLE 3
TRANSACTION BASIS FOR ALL PJR's
Adversary Ex Parte All PJR's
Connecticut
Notes and Credit Cards 152 44% 36 44% 188 44%
Goods 64 19% 15 18% 79 19%
Services 36 10% 10 12%o 46 11%
Materials and Labor 31 9 % 5 6 % 36 8%
Other 61 18% 16 20% 77 18%
N1 =344 N2 =82 N =426
Massachusetts
Notes and Credit Cards 54 27% 7 27% 61 27%
Goods 51 26% 3 12% 54 24%o
Services 27 14% 5 19%b 32 14%y
Materials and Labor 17 9% 0 0%0 17 8%Y
Other 49 25% 11 42% 60 27%
N3 = 198 N4 = 26 N =224
1. Six of the 350 files did not specify transaction basis.
2. One of 83 files did not specify transaction basis.
3. Sixteen of 214 files did not specify transaction basis.
4. One of 27 files did not specify transaction basis.
D. What Property Is Attached?
The type of property attached is known for enough cases in Con-
necticut and Massachusetts. 2 For all PJR's in Connecticut for which
62. Wage garnishments (termed "trustee process" in Massachusetts) are not con-
sidered here. These "takings" are accomplished by other procedural means in Connecti-
cut and Massachusetts. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361 (West 1960 & Supp. 1978);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 246, § 1 (West 1960 & Supp. 1978); MAss. R. Civ. P.
4.2. There were no wages sought to be attached in any of the files we examined. Neither
were any security interests (consensual liens within the meaning of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-203) asserted in any of the sample
cases.
But our sample includes cases of what is termed garnishment (i.e., attachment of
the debtor's property in the possession of a third party).
There is less specification of the property to be attached than one might suppose
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the attached property is known it is evident that attachment of real
estate is the preferred practice:6 271 of the 313 known cases (87%);
of the adversary PJR's, 216 of 240 known cases (90%); of the ex parte
PJR's, 55 of 73 known cases (75%). The data are much the same in
Massachusetts: real estate attachments comprised 180 of the 219 known
cases (82%); of the adversary PJR's, 158 of 192 known cases (82%);
of the ex parte PJR's, 22 of 27 known cases (81%).
There are too few ex partes in Massachusetts to infer much more.
Sixteen motor vehicles (7% of the 219 known cases) were summarily
attached although only 4 were actually seized and taken. All other
personal property accounts for 21 cases (10%). This personal prop-
erty does not include bank accounts. In Connecticut bank accounts
are more common in the ex parte PJR's: there were 9 such attach-
ments (12% of the 73 known cases); of the adversary PJR's in Con-
necticut, 10 (4% of the 240 known cases) were attachments of bank
accounts.
We had thought that movables would be more common. Although
bank accounts fit into the category of "movables," obviously real estate
is preferred; or real estate is more available, or more valuable, or both.
We think it fair to say that the PJR's are not used primarily for coer-
cion or to harass by depriving the defendant of the use of a motor ve-
hicle or bank account. Rather, it seems that the extensive use of pre-
judgment attachments is to have security for a judgment which the
creditor thinks he will get and, as an important element of the security,
to have priority over later creditors. This probably accounts for the
frequent attachment of real estate. 4
given the statutory and case law constraints. For in addition to the 132 (of 547 sample
cases) in which the property attached or to be attached could not be known from any
information in the files, a fair number of the attachments said no more than "personal
property located at . . . ." or named specific property and added a catch-all phrase to
cover all other personal property of the defendant at the same location.
63. Recall that the effect of the attachment is to create a lien on the property to
secure (that is, to have those assets available to be sold to satisfy) a later judgment
which the plaintiff gets against the defendant. Also, the plaintiff whose attachment is
first in time has priority over later claims to the attached property.
64. These are apt to increase in number. Under the 1976 amendments real estate
is subject to ex parte prejudgment attachment merely upon an allegation of probable
cause without even the usual pro forma showing of special circumstances. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-278e(1) (West Supp. 1978).
A later sampling was conducted for a rough assay of the impact of these easy-to-
obtain ex parte prejudgment attachments of real estate. In the Waterbury (Connecticut)
Circuit Court such records were available. A sample of files (from February to June,
1977) was taken for 75 contract-based actions started by prejudgment attachment. Of
those 75 PJR's, 70 were ex parte PJR's; and of those 70 ex parte PJR's, 65 were real
estate attachments.
The combination of real estate as the favored subject of attachment (see Table 4)
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From the defendant's standpoint, he has been deprived only of
the ability to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber his real estate. And
not necessarily even that because the real estate could, in theory, be
sold or remortgaged subject to the attachment. 65 The defendant need
not lose even the rental income from the real estate. But the attach-
ment is considered a "taking" in constitutional terms,66 although there
is much disagreement in the case holdings. The questions whether
some or all nonpossessory prejudgment attachments of real estate are
and the *new ease of ex parte prejudgment attachment of real estate suggests that this
is the most substantial problem for doctrine by reason of greater potential impact upon
debtors and creditors.
65. Commentators think that this is a distinction of form rather than substance
and that a nonpossessory lien (as in the attachment of real estate) is just as much a
taking, in due process terms, as physical removal or the inability to draw checks on an
attached bank account. See, e.g., Note, 82 YALE L.. 1023, n.4 (1973).
66. Although it is generally accepted that attachment without more is a "taking"
such as to invoke the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment, substantially
this description is rejected in Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102
(D. Conn. 1971), on the basis that merely placing a cloud on the title of the defen-
dant's real estate was not a substantial enough interference to constitute a taking. So
far as we could determine, the attachment of real estate did not seriously interfere with
the defendants in any of our sample cases as it might have if, for example, they had
been in the business of selling real estate. In one observed case the defendant appeared
in court not knowing that his real estate had been attached. Practitioners think such
incidents are probably common.
One analyst points out that Black Watch Farms has not been followed in case law
doctrine and that the decision was prior to the Supreme Court decision in Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor: The Impact of
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 28 OKLA. L. REa. 743, 774, n.120 (1975). The precedential
value of Black Watch Farms was rejected in Bay State Harness Horse R. & B. Ass'n v.
PPG Indus., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1305-6 (D. Mass. 1973). There is a supportive dictum
in North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975): "We are
no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds
of property in applying the Due Process Clause."
A recent decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals opines that this dictum does not
apply to real property and holds that prejudgment attachments of real property "do not
deprive the debtor of any significant property interest." First Recreation Corp. v.
Amoroso, 26 Ariz. App. 477, 549 P.2d 257, 259-60, vacated 113 Ariz. 572, 558 P.2d
917 (1976). A similar holding with more force is Hansen v. Weyerhauser Co., 526 F.2d
505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976). (The Arizona and Washington
procedures are very like those in Connecticut and Massachusetts). These cases have
support in The Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975), which rejected a challenge
to thc constitutionality of a similar Maine statute permitting prejudgment attachment
of real estate. A similar practice in Vermont was recently held unconstitutional. Briere v.
Agway, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 654 (D. Vt. 1977); Terranova v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 396
F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt. 1975). Briere, however, did appear to involve a (non-possessory)
taking in reality, not merely in doctrine. The prejudgment attachment followed upon
the advertisement of an auction of real and personal property. Two lawyers for the
attaching creditor read a statement at the auction claiming that all the property to be
sold was subject to their prior writ and lien of attachment. The debtors claimed that
as a result "they were unable to receive a full return upon their property sold at auc-
tion." Briere v. Agway, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D. Vt. 1977). This matter appears
to be resolved by requiring an adversary PJR even for non-possessory prejudgment at-
tachment of real property. See Vermont Act of April 1, 1978, S.124.
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unconstitutional remain to be decided by the federal Supreme Court,
which could leave these matters to the several states on the basis that
federal courts should abstain from staying or enjoining state court pro-
ceedings except under special circumstances, and especially where a
state court interpretation might save the constitutionality of the state
statute.
6 7
TABLE 4
PROPERTY ATTACHED
Adversary Ex Parte All PJR's
Connecticut
Real Estate 216 90% 55 75% 271 87%
Bank Accounts 10 4% 9 12% 19 6%
Motor Vehicles 3 1% 2 3% 5 2%
Other' 11 5% 7 10% 18 6%
N = 240 N3 = 73 N 313
Massachusetts
Real Estate 158 82% 22 81% 180 82%
Bank Accounts 0 0% 2 7% 2 1%
Motor Vehicles 15 8% 1 4% 16 7%
Other1  19 10% 2 7% 21 10%
N4  192 N=27 N=219
1. A good many of these were for debts or money due to the defendant or for
personal property of the defendant in the possession of others.
2. One hundred and ten of 350 files did not specify property.
3. Ten of 83 files did not specify property.
4. Twenty-two of 214 files did not specify property.
E. Size of PJR's
The mean amounts of the claims made in the prejudgment attach-
ments are large considering that most of the transactions-probably
three-fourths or more-appear to be for consumer credit. This seems
to be explained by several instances of various kinds of home improve-
ment loans and a few large claims in each of the three groups. There
is not a great difference in amount between the adversary and the ex
parte prejudgment attachments. The Massachusetts cases, as a group,
are for smaller amounts than those in Connecticut.
67. See Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), rev'g Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp.
951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three-judge court).
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TABLE 5
SIZE OF PJR's
Adversary Ex Parte All PJR's
Connecticut
Mean $5342 $4972 $5269
Median $3940 $3100 $4000
N 3381 83 421
Massachusetts
Mean $2513 $58152 $2893
Median $1265 $2503 $1391
N 2003 264 226
1. Twelve of 350 files did not specify amount.
2. This large mean of ex parte attachments is in part accounted for by one claim
of $27,000.
3. Fourteen of 214 files did not specify amount.
4. One of 27 files did not specify amount.
F. How Different is the Ex Parte PJR?
One way to determine whether the ex parte remedy is or ought
to be considered extraordinary is to work backward from the results
of the adversary and ex parte attachments. In the case of an adversary
prejudgment attachment, the writ is issued and served on the defendant
who has a chance to appear on the return date of the writ and to con-
test the attachment or ask that the request for the attachment be
granted only if modified or reduced. Recall that in the case of an ex
parte PJR, the attachment is the first notice -that the defendant gets; he
must thereafter take it upon himself to appear and defend or assert his
rights. There are some differences in result that may be significant.
Where the results could be found (many cases simply remain open
with no record of what happened) less than 3% of the Massachusetts
defendants and about 10% of the Connecticut defendants appeared.
But this is a gross figure for both types of attachment. When given
notice in the adversary prejudgment attachment, 43 of 350 defendants
appeared in Connecticut (about 12%); and in Massachusetts 6 of 214
defendants appeared (about 3%). (Most of these appearances are not
for arguments at hearings but for negotiations between the parties and
their lawyers while waiting in the corridors. In the largest number of
conventional PJR hearings no one appears because suitable arrange-
ments have already been made.) In neither state did any of the actual
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appearances result in denial or even modification of the attachment
sought. From the little we could find out, we guess (and it is said by
those around the courts) that something on the order of one in a
-hundred of the adversary prejudgment attachments which are con-
tested (the 12% in Connecticut and about 3% in Massachusetts in
which the defendant appears at the scheduled hearing) result in denial
or any modification other than the occasional posting of a bond in place
of -the attached property. Note that there were no requests for hearings
in any of the 11I ex parte PJR's in Connecticut and Massachusetts.
G. Debtor and Judicial Responses
The files provide sparse information. In 145 of the 241 PJR's in
Massachusetts there was no record of what, if anything, took place, ex-
cept for the attachment. If we deal only with the known cases, then
6% (6 of 96) of the Massachusetts defendants appeared and 94% did
not. The 27 ex parte PJR's in Massachusetts revealed no appearances.
There were more frequent appearances 'by defendants in Connecti-
cut. Again most files provided no information. But 46 arrangements
for appearance were made, and in 43 of those known cases the defen-
dants did in fact appear. This is 10% of the 433 Connecticut cases of
both types. And though the numbers are inadequate in Massachusetts,
that is four times the 2.5% (6 of 241) frequency of defendants' appear-
ances in Massachusetts. There were no arrangements of record for any
hearings in the 83 ex parte PJR's in Connecticut, although we know
from specific inquiries with lawyers that informal arrangements and
settlements were made in some of those 83 ex parte PJR's. This may
show again that the pleadings and even court records sometimes fail to
reflect much of what is happening.6
The only issue before a court in the usual case when the adversary
prejudgment attachment is contested is whether the plaintiff seeking
68. This lack of record information is also true of identification of the parties, the
users of the courts. See Cartwright, Conclusion: Disputes and Reported Cases, 9 LAw
& Soc. REV. 369, 370 (1974). Had we been dealing with earlier history it is unlikely,
for example, that we would have known which of the collection agencies were acting
on behalf of physicians, the real parties in interest.
Although the Connecticut statute provides that an assignee for collection state the
derivation of his right to sue, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-118 (West 1960), many
lawyers do not follow that practice or the form reciting an assignment given in 2 J.
KAYE, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE § 4.10 (1966 & Supp. 1975).
In Massachusetts too there are collection agencies as plaintiffs and some banks as
plaintiffs apparently acting as assignees of credit card businesses. But the suit papers
often do not identify the assignor. Rule 17 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure
is more permissive than the Connecticut statute as regards identification of the original
claimant or the origin of the right of action.
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attachment has established "probable cause" that his claim exists. 69
That seems to exclude the usual defenses available to the defendant
under the applicable substantive law. The hearing on an application
for an adversary prejudgment attachment is not a hearing on the merits
of the claim or the defenses.
The hearing on the application for the prejudgment remedy is a
separate and distinct statutory judicial proceeding which is termi-
nated by the order of the court rendered as a result of its determina-
tion of a narrowly restricted question, viz., "whether there is prob-
able cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim." 70
Such substantive defenses as payment, breach of contract by the
plaintiff, set off, and mistake will not be accepted at the hearing on
the prejudgment attachment application unless the defendant's evi-
dence is simple, quite clear and usually supported by written evidence.
This is because of the judicial interpretation of the prejudgment at-
tachment statute and the courts' notions of the proper allocation of
judicial resources. There has not been enough time or procedural play
for pretrial discovery nor, in the usual case, have there been responsive
pleadings by the defendant. All that is before the court is the form that
the plaintiff's lawyer has filed, checked in the appropriate places.
IV. CONJEUrURE ON OTHER MODELS
Since the prejudgment attachments we examined were not
founded on security interests allowing for repossession by self-help or
with judicial order, 71 one can view the process as giving the unsecured
creditor rights more nearly equal to those which the Uniform Commer-
cial Code gives to secured creditors. What appears in the context of
constitutional doctrine to be a matter of the due process rights of
debtors (and property owners), mostly consumers and their lenders,
seems at this lower level to be another aspect in the contest between
secured and unsecured creditors. The purpose of the prejudgment
attachments of both types is stated to be and, in fact, seems to be to
obtain security for the judgment to which the plaintiff claims he is
entitled and to protect that security with as much legal priority as
69. "The hearing shall be limited to a determination of whether or not there is
probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-278d (West Supp. 1978).
70. E.J. Hansen Elevator, Inc. v. Stoll, 36 CONN. L.J. 1, 4 (Feb. 18, 1975).
71. See note 2 supra. See generally U.C.C. art. 9.
19781
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
possible. Also, the attachment lien (and the occasional actual physical
taking) creates leverage for negotiation and settlement.
Our distinct impression, affirmed by several explicit comments, is
that often the creditor's prejudgment attachment is solely to gain the
security of an attachment prior to other potential competing credi-
tors72 The security resulting from the debtor's being unable to sell
or encumber the attached property is incidental. This suggests that
different means of gaining priority or a different mode of distribution
of the debtor's liquidated property might have a greater impact on
these practices73 than revisions in the applicable due process doctrine.
SUMMARY AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
So far as we could determine, the use of PJR's has been substan-
tially reduced in contract-based (mostly consumer credit) transactions,
from about 79% to 50%0 frequency. The present use of PJR's can be
summarized as follows: (1) Ex parte applications are very rarely re-
fused by the courts. (2) Defendants seldom contest or otherwise liti-
gate the granting of an ex parte prejudgment attachment. (3) Even
given the advance notice that an attachment is sought, the defendants
infrequently appear. (4) When a defendant does appear and contest
the attachment, it 'has little or no effect.74
It appears to be most unusual for an ex parte application to be
denied. (Nor will adversary PJR's 'be denied except when the plaintiff
fails to appear.) In Massachusetts, denials will ordinarily occur only
if the court is evidently inconvenient to the defendant or at a great
distance from the defendant's residence or place of business.'7 In Con-
72. We have some evidence in support of the common notion that PJR's and other
similar creditor's remedies come in clusters.
73. The possibility exists in many nonpossessory liens such as attachments on real
estate and motor vehicles in most states. Priority of lien could be a function of some
form of notice by filing. This has been suggested by spokesmen for consumer lenders in
an elaborate proposal with "perfection" dating from the sale of the money. See Wenk
& Moye, Debtor-Creditor Remedies: A New Proposal, 54 CORNELL L. Rav. 249, 262-3
(1969).
74. There were a few examples of an appearance by the defendant to contest the
issuance of an ex parte PJR in which the court found that none of the statutory grounds
for the ex parte order were proven. Then, on plaintiff's motion, the judge agreed that
as all the parties were present and "probable cause" was established, the matter be
treated as a sort of show cause hearing for the issuance of an adversary PJR, which was
then ordered. This is said to be common practice.
75. Although it satisfies the statutory requirements if the action is started where
the property to be attached is located or where the contract was signed or where either
the plaintiff or the defendant "lives or has his usual place of business." 14A D. ShiMpsoN
& H. ALPERIN, supra note 54, § 1212 (1974). Inconvenient venue seems to be the
only basis for exercise of occasional protective judicial discretion in Springfield.
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necticut, we were told, almost no ex parte writs were denied, although
lawyers reported that sometimes they had to go to a second judge. Ex-
perienced practitioners know to avoid judges who are reluctant or who
ask questions about the grounds for ex parte applications.7 6 That seems
evident from our inquiries with lawyers and also from our data in
Connecticut. During the time covered by our sample of cases, 24 identi-
fied judges sat, though for unknown periods of time. But only 5 judges
(21% of the identified judges) granted 41 of 75 ex parte writs (those
in which the judge is identifiable), accounting for 55o of the known
ex parte PJR's and about 49% of all ex parte PJR's. 7
For the nine-tenths of prejudgment attachments -that are adversary
proceedings, with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before
the "taking" of the attachment, 78 recall that less than 30% of the defen-
dants appeared in Massachusetts 9 and 'that our sample of 564 adversary
PJR's revealed relatively few in which the requested attachment was
denied or even modified.80 This finding is consistent with what we
could find out from practitioners and court clerks. In all our adversary
PJR's, 95 of 350 (27%/) were not -ordered in Connecticut and 32 of
214 (15%) were not ordered in Massachusetts. Nearly all these failures
to order attachments were because the plaintiff did not appear at the
hearing. Common practice is, with the pressure and extra leverage of
the pending hearing on the attachment, to negotiate a settlement,8 '
often concluded the morning of the hearing.
76. Prof. Pearson discusses the practice in Louisiana and points out that the judge
is not acting -in a judicial capacity for due process purposes unless he "can inquire into
or assess the reasons why summary seizure is necessary in each case." Otherwise the
judge's function is clerical. Pearson, supra note 66, at 789 (emphasis in original). It
seems unlikely that most judges will make the requisite inquiries or require evidence be-
yond the allegations in the printed form.
77. This may be a factor contributing to the apparently considerable reduction in
the use of ex parte PJR's before the 1976 amendment regarding real estate. See note 41
supra. There are indications that the reluctance of many judges to sign ex parte PJR
writs may account for some of the decrease in their use. Some practitioners speak of the
inconvenience, the delay and consequent expense of seeking out a cooperative or willing
judge. It seems evident from the comments of the judges and the additional ex parte
hearings observed since our archival data were gathered that some judges have been
sensitized to problems of summary deprivation of property in an ex parte attachment
for other than real estate.
78. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
79. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
80. There were only four modifications ordered in our entire sample of 674 PJR's'
Two reductions were in adversary proceedings and one in an ex parte where both
parties later appeared, perhaps by agreement. There was one increase in an attachment
from $360 to $750 at the plaintiff's request. We do not know how many modifications
were sought. This is usually done by oral motion in court.
81. These settlements are noted of record in the files of 17 of 209 known cases
in Massachusetts (8%) and in 72 of 193 known cases in Connecticut (9%). Many more
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Students observing a few contested applications for prejudgment
attachments (the adversary type) all concluded that even with the
presence of counsel for the defendant, the plaintiff's establishment of
"probable cause" was easily satisfied and was, in fact, as one reported
case had it, something rather less than the usual burden of proof in
civil cases, a preponderance of -the evidence . 2 One student reported
that a lawyer's contention on behalf of a defendant that "probable
cause" meant more than a "scintilla of evidence" was quickly rejected.
The general consensus is that if the plaintiff appeared at the hearing,
so long as his claim did not seem patently false or without foundation,
the attachment was ordered. 3 Of course this constitutes an appealable
order,"' but a decision on an appeal could take months and, of course,
add considerably to the defendant's cost. Given that half the adversary
PJR's are based on claims of less than $4000 in Connecticut and less
than $1300 in Springfield (Table 5), the sums expended in appearance
at the hearing and for the perfection and prosecution of an appeal
usually make settlement the more prudent alternative.
Some analysts have opined that some of the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court 5 and other appellate courts have made the creditors'
burden so great that they will be unable to get effective protection. 0
They reason that while in the past summary (i.e., ex parte) prejudg-
ment attachment was readily available by mere allegation that the
statutory requirements had been met, now a much more difficult show-
ing is required. We infer from our investigation that, although the
PJR seems to be used less often, when that remedy is sought, the
recently imposed requirements of due process87 have made or seem to
cases are settled but the files simply remain open and do not reveal that fact. This
seems due to the additional costs to the plaintiffs and their lawyers.
82. Rzucidlo v. Newtown Realty, Inc., 30 Conn. Supp. 337, 316 A.2d 514, 517
(C.P. 1974).
83. Realistically meeting the requirements which commentators have suggested-
that the creditor has to show that on the merits of the case he has a just debt and that
he will in all likelihood obtain a judgment; and also that there are not other assets
sufficient to pay the judgment or that there are not apt to be assets remaining to satisfy
a judgment-would be the most dramatic change in practice. In these two states there
are no such requirements, or the requirements are deemed to have been satisfied by an
X in a block on a printed form.
84. Associates Fin. Servs. Co. v. Gear, 31 Conn. Supp. 507, 320 A.2d 835 (C.P.
App. Div. 1974); 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 76-401 § 4(3); cf. Associates Fin. Servs.
Co. v. McIntyre, 367 Mass. 708, 328 N.E.2d 492 (1975).
85. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
86. E.g., Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets
the Constitution, 59 VA. L. Rav. 355, 405 (1973).
87. See note 10 supra.
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have made little difference. The effect upon the defendants probably
is substantially as it was before the much-discussed Supreme Court
decisions. The inertia of routine practices thought not to hurt the
debtors too severely while giving unsecured creditors security with
more priority (and some extra leverage, though not as much as secured
creditors) seems to have reasserted itself with but few exceptions. But
the condemned practices in these two states are now termed "due
process."
Our limited data on the two types of creditors' remedies, one
fairly routine (the adversary prejudgment attachment) and the other
(the ex parte proceeding) taken by doctrine to be an extraordinary
remedy because of its due process implications, show that the two
procedures are much alike. There is little apparent basis in what we.
know of the facts of usage, as distinguished from doctrine, for sharply
distinguishing the adversary from the ex parte process.
The adversary process is issued by the clerk of the court and re-
quires only that there be alleged a debt of the amount claimed. The
application for ex parte prejudgment attachment also must contain a
check in one block on a printed form which states the several statutory
criteria that will support an ex parte proceeding. The ex parte pre-
judgment attachment must be signed by a judge. But both kinds of
PJR's seem to be quite routine. The judges' discretion to refuse an ex.
parte application seems to be exercised infrequently. In Connecticut
the refusals to approve ex parte applications are, as we indicated, diffi-
cult to find of record. There are said to be few such cases. In Spring-
field the few refusals we could find out about seemed to be based on
considerations of venue, that the courthouse (at which the defendant
had to appear if he was to respond) was too distant from the defen-
dant's residence or otherwise seemed to the judge inconvenient for
the defendant. But nearly all the cases in which the adversary pre-
judgment attachment was not ordered resulted only from the plain-
tiff's failure to appear, usually, we surmise, because the matter had
been settled.
The earlier practices for obtaining prejudgment attachments88
88. Formerly, as was pointed out, along with the complaint or summons which
started the lawsuit would be a direction to the sheriff to attach the defendant's prop-,
erty. This was accomplished in Connecticut and Massachusetts without prior notice and
without prior court approval or supervision of any kind. In both states the plaintiff's
lawyer could invoke the right to get an ex parte attachment. For a discussion of the-
now partly invalidated and changed practices, see 9 G. MOTTLA, MASSACHUSETTS
PRACTICE § 166 (1962). See also 1 E. STEPHFNSON, supra note 29, § 41 at 156-63
(1970).
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were well known to practitioners and commentators. But we have
little information on the nature and frequency of those practices.
Given the changes of the past decade in our thinking about long ac-
cepted creditors' remedies doctrine, it is now widely agreed that the
past practices were so one-sided and so unfair as to be subjected to
constitutional limitation.s9 I agree but with qualifications. My con-
cerns are: (1) Whether in this specific area-prejudgment attachment
of personal and real property excluding wages-the changes in legal
doctrine have made any difference to those persons whose property is
attached; (2) Whether law teachers as legal theorists and scholars
merely perceive the world of their professional activity differently;
(3) Whether the recent federal court decisions and the new statutes
have given constitutional grace, so to speak, to the same collection
practices of the same creditors.
Under the ex parte practice that we examined in Connecticut,
the judge did not retain a copy of the writ; there was none in the
court records; the sheriff was paid by the lawyer and did not keep his
"return." Except for the apparently unusual cases where the ex parte
attachment is challenged or where there were other further "record"
proceedings, only the lawyers and the parties knew of the matter and
had copies of the legal papers. Information from those sources cannot
be obtained without the exercise of subpoena powers. A researcher is
not apt to know how often, on what bases, or with what effects this
type of lawsuit occurs. Without the results of a difficult and expensive
sampling of persons and businesses whose names are not easily found
in any court records, one cannot know who or what kinds of persons
and businesses who are creditors and debtors are involved.
Since most of the cases on these as matters of legal doctrine have
been decided on constitutional grounds, one turns to the scholars of
constitutional law who write in the law journals and asks what reality
it is ,that they write about. It seems evident that without knowledge
of 'the effects of past practices, and lacking information on the impact
89. Recall what is different now in Connecticut and Massachusetts: a judge may
order the attachment in the first instance on an ex parte application and after hearing
in the adversary process. So far as we can determine, the impact of this due process
restriction, as measured by the defendants' responses, is limited to less than 10% of the
applications in Massachusetts and in Connecticut. Of these, some few-probably a
fraction of 1% of all applications-result in denial or even modification of the attach-
ment sought.
Much the same circumscribed and ineffectual remedies to limit or invalidate the
attachment still exist. The major difference is that prejudgment attachment is used less
now than under the earlier proscribed practice.
[Vol. 27
1978] PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS 489
of the invalidation of past statutory law and the enactment of new
rules and statutes, the commentators are limited to analysis of the few
appealed cases and such information as the records in those cases reveal.
They can review and analyze changes in doctrine (and how those
changes are justified by appellate judges and the justices of the Su-
preme Court) with the subtlety and elegance we have come to expect.
For the most part, this activity takes place in the closed world of re-
ported cases to reported cases. Of these they can make various logical
and value judgments, b6th types normative. But unless more and better
data are made available in several states, they can make only very
limited and very tentative social value judgments without presuppos-
ing that the few reported cases inform us about other realities. That is
apt to be an unwarranted premise.

